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An International Seabed Authority:
The Impossible Dream?
by Henry C. Byrum, Jr. *
Using a quantitative content methodology, the author analyzes statements made by
participants in the debates at the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference.
The statements were grouped into categories according to the positions taken on three
seabed issues: 1) the competency of an international authority, 2) the locus of power in
an international regime, and 3) resource management. The positions were then ranked
on an internationalism-nationalism scale. A fourth variable based on the state's per
capita GNP was also included. Analysis of the variables reveals, among other things,
that a majority of states at the Conference favored an "internationalist" position on the
seabed issues, but that there was a lack of a consensus on a comprehensive Law of the
Sea Treaty.
A S THE NATIONS of the world dutifully prepare for the Seventh
Session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, one
may well wonder at this time, five years after the Conference's conven-
ing, if there will ever exist a comprehensive sea law treaty. Despite the
flow of ideological verbiage and the courteous atmosphere
characteristic of the Conference, it is questionable whether the unity of
opinion necessary to lay a new cornerstone in international legal doc-
trine has developed. Careful scrutiny of Law of the Sea Summary
Records, including the barrage of proposed articles, resolutions, and
working papers from past sessions, reveals strong cleavages over major
questions, the resolution of which is crucial to a successful sea law
treaty. We have utilized a quantitative content methodology in an at-
tempt to determine states' positions on some of the pressing issues sur-
rounding the formation of an International Seabed Authority
(Authority). The methodology may serve as a useful tool for measuring
the level of consensus among participants on the Authority question,
which is undoubtedly the linchpin of the entire sea law debate and
quest for a new international legal order.
• Research Associate, Office of Public Service and Research, Auburn University.
The writer is indebted to Daniel J. Nelson for his criticisms of the original draft of this
article and for opening the writer's eyes to the imperativeness of international law.
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I. METHODOLOGY
Quantitative content analysis on U.N. records has been ex-
perimented with in previous studies, partially because of the
amenability of U.N. documents as a data source.' There are, of
course, major impediments in the use of U.N. materials, though, in
general, the difficulties are not insurmountable.2
The methodology in this study was designed and applied to earlier
ocean-issue debates3 and has recently been updated. 4 In contrast to the
earlier application, which centered on continental shelf issues, the goal
of the present study is to examine seabed issues. Although these issues
are closely related, the work of the First Committee of the Third U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea has focused almost entirely on the
creation of an International Seabed Authority, leaving continental
shelf delimitation to the Second Committee. The earlier study was con-
cerned with reducing statements made during debates (debates on all
ocean matters) into a series of "themes". The themes were reordered
into groups, designated as "variables," according to their rank on an
internationalism-nationalism scale. The procedure in this study also
seeks to reduce statements on specific subissues to issue-areas. The
issue-area thus becomes the variable. For example, Variable 3 is con-
sidered an economic issue-area. The subissues under Variable 3 in-
clude five possible alternatives that have been proposed to offset the
economic impact of seabed mining on land based procedures. The five
subissues are arranged into an order which the writer believes still em-
braces an internationalism-nationalism concept similar to the one
developed by Friedheim and Kadane. As shown by Table 1, three
variables (issue-areas) were constructed. They are: Variable 1, compe-
tency of the international authority; Variable 2, locus of power within the
authority; and Variable 3, methods of resource management. A fourth
variable, based on per capita GNP's as recorded in the Political Hand-
book of the World: 1977,1 was also included. Such a variable represents
no transformation of data and was introduced in order to have one
Friedheim, Kadane & Gamble, Quantitative Content Analysis of the United
Nations Seabed Debate: Methodology and a Continental Shelf Case Study, 24 INTL
ORGANIZATION 479, 480-81 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Friedheim].
'Id.
Freidheim, supra note 1.
4 Freidheim & Durch, The International Seabed Resources Agency Negotiations
and the New International Economic Order, 31 INT'L ORGANIZATION 343 (1977).
POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD: 1977, at 585-87 (A. Banks ed. 1977).
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"pure" economic indicator for each country. Table 2 indicates that not
all delegates chose to speak on each issue, but N's of 128, 82, 59 and 120
were generated for the respective variables.
TABLE 1: SEABED ISSUE-AREAS
Variable 1: Competency of the International Authroity
1 - Registry
2 - Licensing System
3 - Contractual System
4 - Mixed System
5 - Enterprise (joint venture)
6 - Direct Exploitation
Variable 2: Locus of Power of an International Regime
1 - Council will make major decisions
2 - Powers of the Authority to be clearly defined in Treaty
3 - Council will be based on equal geographic representation or
other criteria
4 - Some powers of the Authority will be defined while others
will not
5 - Assembly and council will be democratic in representation
-no veto system
6 - Authority's powers will be broad, flexible and undefined
7 - Assembly would make major decisions
Variable 3: Resource Management
1 - Minor or no controls
2 - Commodity agreements
3 - Compensation
4 - Price stabilization
5 - Production control
1978
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TABLE 2: TRANSFORMED SCORES FOR
PARTICIPANTS
Country
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Bhutan
Boliva
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burma
Burundi
Canada
Ceylon
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo
Costa Rica
Cuba
Variable 1
1.04
2.82
.97
1.14
.35
.97
.97
1.33
.97
.28
1.15
.93
.97
1.24
-1.35
1.43
.97
-1.35
.97
1.88
2.56
1.96
1.59
.97
1.22
Variable 2
.61
.39
.39
-.65
-1.39
LAW OF THE SEA
Variable 3
-1.45
- .37
.40
.72
-1.45
-1.45
.37
-. 01
.72
.72
;Us
Per Capita
GNP (actual)
78
589
555
1401
4825
4072
80
1065
5388
195
250
679
2001
82
86
5695
937
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Country
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Dahomey
Dem. Rep. of Korea
Democratic Yemen
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Fed. Rep. of Germany
German Dem. Republic
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
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Variable 1
.97
.97
.54
.97
-1.35
.97
2.03
.97
1.28
1.11
.65
.93
-.65
-1.35
-.65
-1.80
1.14
.50
1.28
.97
1.28
.97
.97
.60
.74
.97
.97
Variable 2 Variable 3
-1.84
-2.64
-2.10
.39
.68
.39
.39
.39
.39
sus
Per Capita
GNP (actual)
1626
3366
399
116
6401
586
406
274
344
270
94
4105
5476
6415
5047
327
2021
491
158
594
141
518
2244
5557
139
135
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Country
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Kenya
Khmer Republic
Kuwait
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libyan Arab Rep. (LAR)
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Maritius
Mexico
Monaco
Mongolia
Morocco
Nauru
Variable 1
.97
.97
-2.73
-1.35
-1.35
.97
1.97
-1.62
.97
.97
.97
.97
.97
.97
.97
.97
-1.35
1.54
.97
.97
.97
1.10
.97
1.43
1.22
.97
.97
Variable 2 Variable 3
-.50
.39
$-.37
.39
.39
-2.28
.39
2.17
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Per Capita
GNP (actual)
892
669
2440
2733
558
938
4391
192
9589
80
1016
98
256
5813
183
641
72
1194
232
429
968
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Country
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Republic of Korea
Republic of Vietnam
Romania
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Variable 2
-.50
Variable 3
-1.45
-1.45
Variable 1
.85
.28
1.14
1.10
.97
1.43
.50
.97
1.50
.74
.04
1.43
.97
.97
1.22
2.82
.97
.97
.97
1.03
.97
.97
2.82
.97
.97
.97
lUs
Per Capita
GNP (actual)
132
5059
4139
571
201
5492
539
100
970
403
691
255
1971
1350
6570
401
110
2038
1350
430
175
1976
87
1158
1880
207
139
275
-1.45
-1.45
.72
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Country
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukranian S.S.R.
USSR
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United Rep. of Cameroon
United Rep. of Tanzania
United States
Upper Volta
Uruguay
Venezuela
Western Samoa
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zaire & Zambia
Variable 2
-1.39
-. 05
Variable 3
.72
Variable 1
-. 65
-2.74
.97
1.35
.97
.97
1.50
1.33
.39
-2.28
Vol. 10:621
us
Per Capita
GNP (actual)
6860
7065
381
262
208
1237
518
580
159
2712
7130
3278
268
135
6526
81
912
1572
80
1170
572
N = 120
.97
-1.35
-1.48
.97
-2.04
.97
.45
-2.04
.97
1.29
1.31
.97
.97
1.65
1.43
128
3.969
.720
-2.28
.39
.69
-2.28
.39
.61
.39
.39
.39
N = 82
Av. = 4.561
S = 1.123
N -
Av.
S=
.72
.57
N = 59
Av. = 4.339
S = .921
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Variable 1
Competency of the International Authority, Variable 1, was ar-
ranged on a continuum consisting of six positions. The higher the cor-
responding number of each position, the more international the
subissue was judged to be. For the purpose of operationalizing all three
constructed variables, internationalism was defined as any policy posi-
tion that would place the locus of authority, i.e., the power to set con-
trols and make policy decisions affecting the international seabed area,
(Area) in the hands of an international organization, as opposed to
decisional competence on the part of individual states. Nationalism, on
the other hand, was defined as any policy position that would allow in-
dividual states the competency to operate and make policy decisions
affecting the area, as contrasted to an international regime.
The alternatives for Variable 1 (shown in Table 1) range from an
agency that would act merely as a registry for national mining con-
cerns to an agency that would be directly responsible for all explora-
tion and exploitation within the Area. Licensing and contractual!,
systems represent variations of the registry proposal in that states and
their nationals would retain the privilege of exploring and mining the,
area restricted only by minor regulations of the Authority. The mixed
system, a middle-of-the-road proposal, would permit states to enter in-
to joint ventures with the Authority. Production would be divided in
favor of the Authority, which would represent the majority partner
(perhaps fifty-one percent) in all such ventures. Subissue four
represents a significant step beyond the first three alternatives by plac-
ing competency within the Authority, since it empowers the interna-
tional organization to maintain more controls over the mining process.
Enterprise (the title of the proposed administrative organ) was first
suggested by a group of Latin American states and has enjoyed grow-
ing support in recent years. Unlike the mixed system, the Enterprise
(also called joint venture) would allow the Authority to increase its
monopolistic advantage and thus its control as mine sites come into
production. Eventually such a system would permit the Authority to
take control over all mining operations. The final system, direct ex-
ploitation, grew out of Alternative B to Article 9 of the negotiating
text prepared by Sub-committee I of the U.N. Seabed Committee
prior to Caracas. 6 Under this proposal all competency for mining and
£ See Adede, The System for Exploitation of the "Common Heritage of
Mankind" at the Caracas Conference, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 31, 32-33 (1975).
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related activities in the international area would accrue to the Authori-
ty. Direct exploitation is regarded by many as the only way to protect
the common heritage of mankind. Variable 1 was by far the most
widely discussed issue-area.
Along the internationalism-nationalism continuum constructed
from Variable 1 subissues, subissue one represents the most na-
tionalistic position. The registration system would invest a minimum
amount of control over national endeavors in the International
Authority. Only a handful of countries currently possess the technology
and capital to exploit seabed nodules, and under the registration
system or one of its hybrids, these countries would derive the lion's
share of benefits from nodule mining. Under the direct exploitation
system, on the other hand, the largest amount of revenue and control
would accrue to the Authority. Although direct exploitation by the
Authority would initially not be feasible, hypothetically it would be the
most international alternative in terms of wealth distribution and inter-
national control.
Variable 2
Variable 2 is concerned with two related problems. First, where
will the locus of power within the Authority be? Second, what will be
the extent of rules and regulations governing the future regime? The
future Authority will probably consist of a general assembly, a council,
a secretariat, a dispute settlement organ, and perhaps an enterprise.
The bone of contention centers on the assembly and the council. The
assembly would consist of all contracting parties to the Law of the Sea
Treaty and would make decisions on the principle of one nation one
vote. A sizeable number of Law of the Sea participants have insisted
on the assembly as the decision-making organ. Others support em-
powering the council as the ultimate decisional organ. The council
would have a limited membership based on equal geographic represen-'
tation or other related criteria. To many delegates, granting decision-
making power to the council would merely create another U.N. Securi-
ty Council situation where a minority of nations could veto actions
desired by the majority. A veto power or system of weighted voting is
completely unacceptable to all but the most technologically advance
states.
Variable 2 is arranged along a continuum consisting of seven posi-
tions. Once again the higher the corresponding number of each posi-
tion, the more internationalist the subissue is understood to be.
Subissue one is the most nationalistic position since it places effective
Vol. 10:621
INT'L SEABED AUTHORITY
decision-making power in the hands of a small group of nations.
Developed countries, chief supporters of the council, view it as an
agency in which they would undoubtedly have decisive representation
(after all they would provide most of the capital and technology to the
Authority) and perhaps also some form of veto over decisions they did
not support. Although this might appear contradictory to interna-
tionalism as previously defined, since control would belong to an Inter-
national Authority, it is argued here that such an approach to
decision-making would leave policy formulation entirely at the mercy
of a few states-an extremely nationalist arrangement.
Subissue two would grant to the Authority certain powers of control,
trol, but these powers would have to be specified clearly in the original
convention. Supporters of this position favor rather limited powers for
the Authority and refuse to grant it flexible and wide-ranging powers
that could be used to manage future seabed problems. Subissue three
represents another attempt to create a competent council which advan-
taged states could possibly manipulate. Subissue three would define
fewer powers of the Authority than number two, however, leaving the
Authority wider areas into which it might later expand its competence.
Subissues five and six would remove any threat of veto within the
council and would ensure the Authority of extensive controls if it
desired to exercise them. Subissue seven would place all power within
the assembly. The assembly, as noted earlier, would make all decisions
in a democratic fashion, permitting the international authority to
determine its own boundaries of control within the seabed area
without restriction by a small nationalist bloc of states.
Variable 3
Seabed mining has a number of economic implications for land
based mineral producers. According to U.N. sources, by 1985 nearly
three-fourths of the world's cobald demands could be met from the
oceans. Managing the impact of nodules on world mineral markets is
an extremely sensitive issue. Variable 3 was designed to embrace this
problem. Subissue one suggests that no production controls would be
applied. Supporters of this view are convinced that only through
natural market restraints should nodule production be controlled.
They argue that market estimates for the future are inconclusive and
may or may not detail an accurate picture of potential demands.
Regulation of production, to this group, would stifle nodule exploita-
tion by delaying entry into the Area and by restricting the extent of in-
vestment per mining site.
1978
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Subissue two proposes commodity agreements. Supporters of this
alternative contend that commodity controls should be applied to both
seabed and land-based production simultaneously, severely limiting the
Authority in protecting mineral markets of developing states. For this
reason, commodity arrangements score high on nationalism.
Compensation, subissue three, has been suggested as appropriate
repayment to land-based producers for losses suffered as a result of
seabed mining. Certain problems are intrinsic to this plan,7 the fun-
damental weakness being that "the International Sea-Bed Authority
would not have enough funds if they were confined to the net revenue
from seabed exploitation," to conduct a compensatory program. 8
Nevertheless, compensatory methods have received approval from
representatives of both developed and developing states, and these
methods represent important limitations on individual state activities
within the Area.
Subissues four and five are closely related. Price stabilization
techniques would be employed by the Authority if it appeared that
nodule production were a real threat to land-based mineral producers.
This necessarily entails more international control than compensation.
The ultimate plan to assure preservation of international metal
markets for land-based producers would be full regulation of nodule
production by and at the discretion of the International Authority.
Subissue five has garnered a large amount of support, although it has
been shown to suffer from a number of weaknesses as well. It ranks as
the most internationalistic alternative since it would invest the Authori-
ty with ultimate control over nodule production.
Coding
All data coded for the present study represented positive statements
made by delegates, that is, statements that pointed directly to a posi-
tion favored by the respective states. A major assumption in working
with U.N. debates is that states devote the bulk of their debate time to
expounding the positions they favor. Another relevant assumption is
that the "off the record" views of the delegates will eventually surface
in floor debates. Again, only those statements which specifically stated
or implied a state's position were coded. For instance, statements such
as "Bangladesh favoured an Authority empowered to undertake all
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 2 OR C.1 (2d Sess. Caracas)
(6th mtg.) 27 (1974).
8 Id.
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relevant activities in the zone. . . " or "the Authority should grant
them [states and companies] . . . licenses to explore and exploit ... "10
would be coded. A negative statement such as "Ecuador was strongly
opposed to any licensing system ...... " would not be coded, since it
neither stated nor implied the position of the Ecuadorian Government.
Even though certain objections might be raised to this method of
coding, it appeared to work well and has been utilized by other
scholars. It also enables the researcher to limit the project to a
workable scope. One complete reading of all the documents for each
variable was required for coding the body of data. It is important to
note that all coding was done by the writer; however, coding was spot-
checked by a separate individual for consistency and appropriateness.
Scoring
In order to arrive at a "score" for each participant on each
variable, Friedheim and Kadane's method was employed. Each
subissue must assume some value in order for quantitative analysis to
be utilized. This value was determined by the position of each subissue
along the variable continuums shown in Table 1. For example, each
reference to "production controls" under Variable 3 would receive a
score of 5. Each reference by a participant to "registry" under Variable
1 would receive a score of 1. As in the Friedheim and Kadane study,
the method as used here is an example of "artificial measurement".
Friedheim and Kadane confront three major problems with this
form of measurement.' 2 These are, first, the effect of omitting a theme
(subissue); second, the effect of reversing adjacent themes; and third,
the effect of different data transformations (i.e., will altering scores
leave the continuums in the same order?). The authors reach tenable
conclusions as to the integrity of their study on each point. However, it
should be pointed out that one important step in empirical analysis has
been more or less glossed over by an apparent a priori assumption. Is
it proper to transform ordinal to interval data for analytical purposes?
This study is based on the assumption that such a transformation is
permissible and that there is ample evidence for this procedure in the
literature.13 With this assumption made, it is possible to assign each
I Id. (5th mtg.) at 23.
10 Id. (4th mtg.) at 15.
1 Id. (7th mtg.) at 35.
12 Freidheim, supra note 1, at 486.
11 Freidheim and Kadane obviously accept this method as proper. Additionally,
they note Moses, Brody, Holsti, Kadane, and Milatein, Scah'ng Data on Inter-Nation
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subissue an absolute number thereby creating the possibility of
generating scores for each state on each variable.
Keeping the these considerations in mind, the debates were coded
and a raw score for each participant on each variable was derived.
(Not all participants chose to speak on each issue.) For each state mak-
ing any positive statements on any subissue, a variable score was com-
puted by following two basic steps. First, the corresponding number
(rank number of the subissue along its continuum as shown in Table
2) was multiplied by the number of references made by the participant
to that subissue. For example, three references to "licensing system"
under Variable 1 would produce a score of 6. Licensing has an assign-
ed value of 2 along its continuum, thus: 3 references X 2 (assigned
value) = 6. Second, the scores for each subissue mentioned under a
variable were summed to form a total score. This total score was then
divided by the number of references to all subissues under a particular
variable to form a raw score. The raw score represents the mean
(average) score or typical view of the participant on the variable. The
raw scores for all participants on each variable were computed, but are
not included here due to the lengthiness of a composite table. Instead,
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show histograms (a form of frequency distribution),
based on raw scores, for each variable.
Action, 156 SCIENCE 1054 (1967), as an example of "artificial measurement". N. Nie,
C. Hull, J. Jenkins, K. Steinbrenner, and D. Bent note three works that support the
assignment of numeric values to ordinal data, thus creating an ordered metric scale.
SPSS: STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 6 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as N. NIE]. These are: Abelson and Tukey, Efficient Conversion of Non-Metric
Information into Metric Information, in THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL PRO-
BLEMS 407 (E. Tufte ed. 1970); Labovitz, The Assignment of Numbers to Rank Order
Categories, 35 AM. Soc. REV. 515 (1970); and Labovitz, Statistical Usage in
Sociology: Sacred Cows and Ritual, 1 Soc. METHODS & RESEARCH 13 (1972).
Labovitz points out that "[allthough some small error may accompany the treatment
of ordinal variables as interval, that is offset by the use of more powerful, more sen-
sitive, better developed, and more clearly interpretable statistics .... The Assignment
of Numbers to Rank Order Categories, supra, at 515 (footnote omitted).
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FIGURE 1: RAW SCORE POSITIONS ON VARIABLE 1: HISTOGRAM
CODE
I
2 ***** ( 7)
I
I
I
3 ******* ( 11)
I
I
I
4 **************************************** ( 92)
I
I
I
5 ********* ( 15)
I
I
I
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I
I
(N/A) **** ( 6)
I
I
I .... I ...... I.... I.... I.... I
0 20
FREQUENCY
40 60 80 100
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FIGURE 2: RAW SCORE POSITIONS ON VARIABLE 2: HISTOGRAM
CODE
1 ** (
I
I
I
2 ****
I
I
I
3 ****
I
4
( 6)
( 6)
( 11)
I
I
5*************************** ( 51)
I
I
I
6 **** ( 5)
I
I
I
7 ** ( 2)
I
I
I
(N/A) *************************** (52)
I
I
0 20 40 60 80
FREQUENCY
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FIGURE 3: RAW SCORE POSITIONS ON VARIABLE 3: HISTOGRAM
CODE
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Direct comparison between variables was permissible following a
transformation of the raw scores. This was accomplished in the follow-
ing fashion. The standard deviation and average for each variable was
computed first. Then the variable average was subtracted from the
raw score and divided by the variable standard deviation. Table 2 lists
all transformed scores plus the averages and standard deviations used
in the computations.
By employing the itnernationalism-nationalism scale, it is possible
to compare variables within a common framework. Transforming
variables overcomes the disparities created by the unequal number of
subissues within the three variables. A comparison of transformed
scores by plotting variables against each other provides insight into
group politics at the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference.
II. ANALYSIS
Competency of the International Authority (Variable 1) and the
locus of decision-making power (Variable 2) are compared in Figures 4
and 5. Figure 4 shows raw scores of the variables plotted against each
other. Although illustrations based on raw scores are informative, we
have opted to omit raw score graphs and concentrate on those showing
transformed scores. Pearson's correlation (r) was computed for these
two variables producing a coefficient of .69. When r2 (coefficient
of determination) is calculated, it produces a coefficient of .48, that is,
nearly one-half of the variance in Variable 1 is predicated by Variable
2.
Figure 5 provides a much clearer breakdown in group positions on
Variables 1 and 2. A glance at Figure 5 immediately reveals a clear
split along North-South lines. (Countries with highly similar scores
were "grouped" to facilitate plotting.) The upper right quadrant con-
sists of nations receiving high scores on internationalism for both
Variables 1 and 2. The strongly international group contains all of the
Latin American and African nations plus Iceland, Spain, Romania,
Yugoslavia, and Greece. Except for four of these countries, the group
is composed entirely of the Group of 77 members (Yugoslavia is con-
sidered a member). The Latin Americans scored high on Variable 1 as
a group mainly due to their almost unanimous support of the Enter-
prise system. The Non-Group of 77 members falling in the interna-
tionalism quadrant are not potential nodule miners.
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FIGURE 4: STATES' VIEWS ON SEABED ISSUES 1 AND 2
Kuwait . a Cuba
Brazil
ThailIand * 1l~*Spain
a n M lta Portugal 0
oMexico
Tuni Congo
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Iceland ^ Group 
B* aMadagascar
Ireland * Denmark e. - * ••o-Group C*( Kenya GrouA' * Pk a
tPhilippines u\ o 
Pakistan
Switzerland * 0 Nepal Ethiopia China
Rep. of Vietn<m * Poland j G ile 0
LL_ 1 Salvador
Libyan _e 6 0 Iraq (Guyana
Arab Republic Xustralia
Bulgaria-* e
GDR ,
Republic of Korea
Sweden *Burma
Francb
United Kingdom
USA 0. ?*a USSR
Japan
e FRG
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variable I
*Group A
Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab
Republic, Mali, Marituis, Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,
Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Cameroon, Upper Volta
*Group B
Argentina, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Mauritania, Nigeria, Singapore
*Group C
Bangladesh, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and
Zambia
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FIGURE 5: STATES' TRANSFORMED SCORES ON SEABED ISSUES
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INT'L SEABED AUTHORITY
Diametrically opposed to the internationalists are a group of
developed countries that will no doubt be leaders in nodule production
if given the opportunity to exploit the Area. The group is composed
chiefly of East and West European nations. The appearance of the
USSR in the nationalists quadrant marks one of the most significant
changes in political position since the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea
Conferences. The Soviet Union during the Third U.N. Law of the Sea
Conference has taken a position near that of their earlier rivals. Driven
by a persistent distrust of strong international organizations that seek
to limit states' rights, the Soviets have split with their allies of the past
two conferences over the International Authority issue. William E.
Butler notes that the Soviet proposal holds: "(1) all States and peoples
are entitled to exploit the seabed of the 'world ocean' beyond the
seaward limit of the continental shelf; and (2) no single state can claim
any exclusive rights and privileges to the detriment of other States and
peoples. 1'4 The Soviets recommend a joint system (not joint venture) in
which a smaller portion of the international area is restricted for ex-
ploitation by states and the International Authority, separately, and a
larger portion where the Authority has absolute jurisdiction.
The Soviets have taken a highly nationalist stance on Variable 2 as
well, particularly as it concerns the establishment of the powers of the
International Authority. Edward Miles has stated that:
The Soviet representatives argued that they had to know what laws
and conditions would govern the participation of state enterprises in
the expensive and complex exploitation of the seabed. The Soviet
Union, they warned, could not accede to the convention until it was
clear that the convention was acceptable and this meant that the
details had to be worked into the convention and not left for the
authority to determine. 15
The United States and United Kingdom score the same on
Variable 1. Both have been plagued by onerous balance of trade
deficits in recent years and hence may view nodules as one source of
' Butler, The USSR and the Limits to National Jurisdiction Over the Seas:-
1970-1972, in LIMITS TO NATIONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE SEAS 191 (G. Yates & J.
Young eds. 1974).
"B Miles, An Interpretation of the Caracas Proceedings, in LAW OF THE
SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND (Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute, Ninth An-
nual Conference, Jan. 6-9, 1975) 39 (F. Christy, T. Clingan, J. Gamble, H. Knight, &
E. Miles edi. 1975).
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economic relief. The United States is by far the world's leading im-
porter of metals and would stand to profit considerably should private
American corporations be permitted to harvest nodules. France and
the Federal Repubic of Germany together with Japan also have great
interest in their prospective seabed consortia.
On Variable 2 the United States and others in the nationalist
quadrant support the council as the decision-making organ of the
Authority. The group also supports a limited membership in the coun-
cil with each member retaining a veto power similar to the setup of the
U.N. Security Council. Each individual state would be allowed to veto
a decision, thus forcing additional deliberation on the matter. This
position has met with stiff rejection from the Group of 77 members.
The tipper left quadrant of Figure 5 contains two countries, Den-
mark and Ireland, which are best classified as moderates. Although
scoring high on Variable 1, both countries took moderate interna-
tionalist stands on Variable 2 and were supportive of the assembly as
the locus of decisional power.
The lower right quadrant also contains a group of moderates that
includes most notably Australia. A potential seabed miner, Australia
has not taken a radical stand on either issue due mainly to economic
factors. Australia, as a major metal producer, must look to the Inter-
national Regime to regulate seabed activities. However, Australia also
senses a need to encourage a system that would permit admission to
the Area by individual states.
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FIGURE 6: STATES' TRANSFORMED SCORES ON SEABED ISSUES
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Variables 1 and 3 are plotted in Figure 6. When r is computed for
both variables, a coefficient of .27 results, with the significance of r at
.01. The coefficient of determination is .08, meaning that less than ten
percent of the variance in Variable 1 is predicated by Variable 3. Con-
sequently, the correlation suggests a lack of relationship between posi-
tions taken on "Competency" and "Resource Management".
The extremely nationalist position taken by the United States is ex-
plained by the low score on Variable 3. The United States produced a
1.00 raw score. Production regulation, in the American view, would
delay entry into the nodule exploitation field. Mr. Ratner, a U.S.
delegate at the Thirteenth Meeting of the Caracas Session, stated: "it
was impossible to verify that sea-bed production would clearly reduce
the output or income of the producers of nickel, copper, and cobalt
and manganese in the developing countries from their present levels."
1 6
The American delegation would be content to wait until there is
definite proof that seabed mining is detrimentally influencing world
metal markets. Production controls would not be a suitable method for
protecting only producers of the developing countries since developed
states would also be affected. The developed countries are also mineral
producers and deserve equal credibility in deciding the issue of
regulating production.
The Group of 77 members constitute the largest number of nations
scoring high on internationalism in Figure 6. Their position has been
one of deep suspicion of possible nodule impact on metal markets of
the developing countries. In 1972, Zaire, for example, produced two-
thirds of the world's total output of cobalt. Other cobalt producers
from the Group of 77 are Cuba, Morocco, the Philippines, and Zam-
bia. Brazil, Gabon, India, Ghana, Morocco, and Zaire are exporters of
manganese. The developing countries also accounted for nearly forty-
two percent of the world's 1972 mine production of copper.' 7 Develop-
ing country producers of manganese and cobalt scored highly interna-
tional on Variable 3 while a major copper exporter, Chile, scored
lower. Copper makets are not threatened by nodule production, at
least in the near future, to the same extent as manganese and cobalt.
The most vociferous delegation on Variable 3 was Zaire and Zambia
which made five references to subissue five under Variable 3.
1s Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 2 OR C.1 (2d Sess. Caracas)
(13th mtg.) 64 (1974).
"1 Id. 3 OR, Economic Implications of Sea-Bed Mineral Development in the In-
ternational Area: Report of the Secretary-General, at 18-19.
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Significantly, the most internationalist of all countries is not a
member of the Group of 77. Figures 5 and 6 show Spain to be the
leading advocate of the internationalist position. The following excerpt
from the Spanish delegate's address to the Eighth Amendment of the
Caracas Session, July 17, 1974, embraces all three issue-areas.
Other delegations saw the Authority as an international organization
with strong powers and broad functions which would include not only
exploration and exploitation but also marketing, with a view to
preventing a decline in the prices of land-produced minerals,
especially those produced by developing countries. The organization
would have a democratic structure, being controlled by an assembly
in which all countries would have voting rights.' 8
His delegation supported this concept.
The upper left quadrant of Figure 6 contains the moderate inter-
nationalists. Most of the participants in this group were supportive of
some form of repayment system from developed to developing coun-
tries. Their scores on Variable 3 placed them on a line with the
developing countries which scored a maximum internationalist score.
Canada is currently the world's leading producer of nickel, the primary
metal to be recovered from nodules. Canada also ranks in the top
three countries in copper production and has expanded into cobalt
mining in recent years. There is little doubt that economic implica-
tions of seabed mining will weigh heavily in Canadian policy on Law
of the Sea. Canada is joined in the moderately intenationalist group by
four other developed countries which appear to be sympathetic toward
the economic position of the developing countries, namely Ireland, the
German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, and Sweden.
The moderately nationalist quadrant contains ten countries from
several geographic regions. Any country with a raw score of 3.0 to 4.34
appears in this sector. Moderately nationalist, in effect, means that
these countries support compensation as the main safeguard against
metal market fluctuations. Their nationalist score on Variable 3 sur-
passes their internationalist position on Variable 1. Surprisingly, South
Africa, a metal producer of importance, averaged a score of 3.0.
South African delegates were linked to only one statement on subissues
two, three, and four, leaving them quite a distance from the position
of other African metal producers. The other moderately nationalist
members rounding out the quadrant, except for Nigeria and Algeria,
11 Id. 2 OR C.A (8th mtg.) at 40.
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were parties to a working paper in which the compensatory method of
production regulation was advanced. 9
Figures 5 and 6 support the hypothesis that the Law of the Sea
debates have evolved into a North-South power struggle. However,
Figure 6 shows a departure from the linear relationship shown in
Figure 5, suggesting that economic influences may have led to a
breakdown in regional group influences. To further assess the varia-
tion, Variables 2 and 3 were plotted against each other.
The developed countries still show strongly nationalistic stances in
Figure 7. A new addition to the nationalist group is Belgium which has
moved from a moderate position on Figures 5 and 6. Austria appears
for the first time, reflecting the nationalist views of its European
neighbors.
The United States remains the most nationalistic of all states plot-
ted. So nationalist is the American position on Variable 3, that there
exists a danger that the distributions shown in Figures 6 and 7 may be
illusory. The position of the United States may tend to visually impair
these two graphs, causing a rather distorted view of the distribution of
other states. For example, in Figure 7 the highest internationalist score
would be .72 while the highest nationalist position would be -3.63.
The Group of 77 members continue to take the internationalist
position most frequently when Variables 2 and 3 are plotted against
each other. In Figure 7 Portugal and Spain continue to relate to the
Group of 77, taking an internationalist stance surpassed only by
Kuwait. Of all Latin American nations having a score on both
variables, Peru, is the only state not within the internationalist
quadrant.
China in Figure 7 for the first time moved into the moderately in-
ternationalist quadrant. A low score on Variable 2 (below the mean of
4.561) is no doubt the reason. The Chinese have been staunch sup-
porters of the international position as is shown by the following state-
ment:
The international machinery should be endowed with real powers, in-
cluding that of engaging directly in the exploration and exploitation
of the resources of the area .... The assembly, in which all contrac-
ting parties would be represented, should be entrusted with all major
"9 Preliminary Working-Paper Submitted by Afgahnistan, Austria, Belgium,
Hungary, Nepal, Netherlands and Singapore, Aug. 19, 1971, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/55
(1971), reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1011 (1971).
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FIGURE 7: STATES' TRANSFORMED SCORES ON SEABED ISSUES
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powers .... [The] delegation supported the principles of equality of
all nations. .... . 0
Chinese delegates have been ardent advocates of any position that
is "anti-superpower," warning that "[t]he super-Powers must not take
advantage of their advanced industrial technology to plunder those
resources directly or indirectly."'" Figure 7 still shows a tremendous
distance between the views of China on the one hand and the United
Kingdom or the United States on the other.
Australia has moved from an internationalist position in Figure 5
to a more moderate position in Figure 7. However, Australia, Sweden,
and the German Democratic Republic have all taken an interna-
tionalist stance on managing seabed resources and are moderated only
by their nationalist scores on Variable 2. The delegate from the Ger-
man Democratic Republic twice stated at Caracas that the Authority
should regulate "the maximum amount of minerals to be exploited." 22
The moderate nationalists in Figure 7 represent basically the same
group that comprised this quadrant in Figure 6. Peru becomes slightly
more nationalist in Figure 7, while Greece becomes slightly less. Greece
remains very close to the internationalist sector throughout each plot-
ting. Concerning Variable 3, Mr. Frangoulis of Greece stated that "[i]n
his delegation's view an appropriate mechanism should be devised to
prevent and/or compensate for any negative effects on the economy of
the developing countries."2 3 Greece scored high on Variable 1. (4.33)
and Variable 2 (5.33) as well. Lacking the necessary technology,
Greece will not be a major nodule exploiter and demonstrates this by
its Law of the Sea policies.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 contain so many plotted scores that the reader
might wish for some simplification of these graphs. Several methods
were considered for reordering states into groups. The first method in-
volved placing states into voting groups similar to those derived by
scholars such as Bruce Russett. 24 Russett's voting groups were not
utilized since to do so would imply that the writer assumes them to be
still valid. In some future research project, it might be valuable to ex-
20 Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 2 OR C. 1 (2d Sess. Caracas)
(8th mtg.) 37 (1974).
23 Id.
22 Id. (2d mtg.) at 5.
13 Id. (14th mtg.) at 68.
24 See, e.g., Russett, Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations, 60 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 327 (1960).'
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amine Russett's 1966 voting groups to see how well they hold true for
issue-areas that developed after his groups were formulated.
A second method considered was reordering states into groups ac-
cording to certain social and economic indicators that have been used
in the past to determine levels of development. 25 This too might be an
area of possible future research. The complexity of such a project,
however, rendered it impracticable for the present study. Here it was
decided, for the sake of simplicity, to reorder states into groups based
solely on per capita GNP, i.e., Variable 4. Per capita GNP, despite
possible objections, does after all represent one valid indicator of the
relative economic standing of a state in global economic relations.
Though the groups may be arbitrary, they nevertheless represent a
method for examining the relationship between Northern and
Southern states on seabed issues. To avoid drawing a clear line be-
tween rich and poor states, the categories of low, medium, and high
were used. The criteria for the groups were: (1) low, $1.00-$499; (2)
medium, $500-$1,999; and (3) high, $2,000-$9,100. A fourth group,
enitled unknown, was created to include states for which per capita
GNP was not available. Component states of each group are not listed
here.
A raw and a transformed score were computed for each per capita
GNP group. The raw score was produced by summing all the scores
for a group on one variable and then dividing by the number of states
in the group to produce a mean. A state not scoring on a variable
would not be used in the calculations. Raw scores for the four groups
were transformed through the process explained earlier.
"s See, e.g., J. ROWE, THE U.S. AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT: AGENDA FOR AC.
TION 1975 (1975).
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Groups are compared on Variables 1 and 2 in Figure 8. States with
high per capita GNP's are the only group with a nationalist score on
both variables. The unknown group scored slightly internationalist on
Variable 2 with its highest internationalist score occuring on Variable
1. Most important, however, is that states with medium per capita
GNP's, rather than low, are the most extreme internationalists on these
two variables. The medium income group is composed of several Latin
American states, the most vociferous seabed debaters, as well as several
of the extreme internationalists shown in Figures 5 through 7. Most
notable among this extremist group are Albania, Portugal, Spain, and
Yugoslavia. While it may be suggested that the low and medium per
capita GNP states show a similar interest on Variables 1 and 2, it is
the medium income group which is most active on the issues.
FIGURE 8: PER
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FIGURE 9: PER CAPITA GNP GROUP POSITIONS ON
VARIABLES 1 AND 3
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Figure 9 shows the comparison of Variables 1 and 3. Low per
capita GNP states retain a position similar to that shown in Figure 8.
This group is the most persistently internationalist on all issues,
although it is not always the group with the highest internationalist
score. The medium group, highly internationalist on Variable 1, has a
transformed score of 0.0 on Variable 3. This score implies a standoff
within the group as to how land-based mineral producers should be
protected. The group of unknown per capita GNP states has increased
its internationalist position slightly over Figure 8. However, it should
be noted that this group is very small (fourteen states) and is composed
entirely of developing countries. Once again, states having high per
capita GNP's tend to be the most nationalist on seabed issues.
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FIGURE 10: PER CAPITA GNP GROUP POSITIONS ON
VARIABLES 2 AND 3
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In Figure 10, the low, medium, and unkown groups remain within
the internationalist quadrant. The low GNP is still the most consistent-
ly internationalist group on all issues, while the unkown group is inter-
nationalist only on Variable 3 and the medium group is interna-
tionalist only on Variable 2. Again, the high per capita GNP group is
the only group taking a solidly nationalist position. It is revealing that
over three-fourths of the states plotted appear in the internationalist
quadrant on all seabed issues.
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A final exercise in analysis was undertaken to assess the overall
relationship among the four Law of the Sea variables. Pearson's correc-
tion (r) was used previously to determine the correlation between two
variables. This process is not additive, that is, the r value for one cor-
relation cannot be summed with the r value of another to provide a
coefficient that explains the total amount of variance in the dependent
variable due to a series of independent variables. Summing the r coef-
ficients could produce values that would result in "overdetermination".
A more valid result can be accomplished through multiple regression,
a process that permits control over "confounding factors in order to
evaluate the contribution of a specific variable or set of variables .... 26
The objective here is to discover the predictive value of each variable.
The multiple regression selected to obtain predictive values was
"stepwise" regression. This allows the entry of one independent
variable at a time into the regression equation according to predeter-
mined criteria. In this exercise variables were entered in their
numerical order. An option was selected in the multiple regression pro-
gram that deleted a case from regression when a value for either
variable was missing. A N of forty-four valid cases was generated
through this procedure.
The forty-four cases involved in multiple regression produced the
following correlation matrix, means, and standard deviations.
VAR I VAR 2 VAR 3 VAR 4 Mean S
VAR 1 1.0000 .7193 .4885 -. 5538 4.5216 .9282
VAR 2 .7193 1.0000 .5369 -. 3935 4.7486 1.2228
VAR 3 .4885 .5369- 1.0000 - .2917 4.5464 .8822
VAR 4 - .5538 -. 3935 - .2917 1.0000 1633.9773 2111.5034
This analysis will examine only the summary tables produced from
multiple regression. These tables show rl changes from one indepen-
dent variable to the next as they appeared in the regression equation.
Tables 3 through 5 present the summary tables in numeric order of
the dependent variable.
IN N. NIE, supra note 13, at 321.
1978
CASE W. RES. J INT'L L.
TABLE 3: SUMMARY REGRESSION WITH VARIABLE 1 DEPENDENT
Variable Multiple R R2  R 2 Change
Variable 2 .71930 .51739 .51739
Variable 3 .72944 .53208 .01469
Variable 4 .78258 .61243 .08034
TABLE 4: SUMMARY REGRESSION WITH VARIABLE 2 DEPENDENT
Variable Multiple R R 2  R 2 Change
Variable 1 .71930 .51739 .51739
Variable 3 .75008 .56262 .04522
Variable 4 .75017 .56276 .00014
TABLE 5: SUMMARY REGRESSION WITH VARIABLE 3 DEPDENDENT
Variable Multiple R R 2  R 2 Change
Variable 1 .48846 .23860 .23860
Variable 2 .55673 .30995 .07135
Variable 4 .55742 .31071 .00077
When Variable 1 was dependent, the majority of variance, fifty-
one percent, was explained by Variable 2. Variables 4 and 3 follow
respectively as contributors in explaining Variable 1. In total, r2 sum-
med to .61 or, in other words, sixty-one percent of Variable 1 is
predicted by the other variables, leaving only thirty-nine percent of
that variable unexplained. Thus, the linear relationship is positive and
the percentage of variation explained is sixty-one percent.
Variable 2, shown in Table 4, is related closest to Variable 1 dur-
ing multiple regression. While Variable 3 contributes only very little to
the explanation of Variable 2 (r = .56, an increase of only .0452),
Variable 4 contributes virtually nothing (r2 change = .00014) to the
explanation. The relationship with Variable 2 dependent is positive
and has a coefficient of determination of .56. We may therefore con-
clude that positions taken on Variable 2 are most closely related to
positions taken on Variable 1. An examination of Figure 2 (Variable 1
as plotted against Variable 2) reveals that the linear relationship be-
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tween these two variables is much more relevant than the relationship
with Variable 3 as shown in Figure 6.
In Table 5, we see that Variable 3 is the most difficult variable to
explain, at least in terms of the variables used in this regression. This
was expected, because scores on Variable 3 as shown in Figures 6 and
7 do not closely relate to positions taken on the power variables (i.e.,
Variables 1 and 2). For example, note the nationalistic scores of
Sweden, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic in Figure 5
as opposed to their positions in Figures 6 and 7. In reverse order, note,
for instance, Afghanistan and Greece in Figure 5, then in Figures 6
and 7. With an overall r 2 of .31, Table 5 suggests that even though
the linear relationship with Variables 1, 2, and 4 is positive, a large
portion, sixty-nine percent, of Variable 3 remains unexplained by the
other variables. Variable 1 has the most predictive value (r2 = .2386),
but the coefficient of determination is too low to be accepted as an
adequate explanation. Nations that scored internationalistic or na-
tionalistic on Variables 1 and 2 alter their positions when Variable 3 is
introduced. This divergence was partially explained earlier, but ap-
pears to be triggered by another variable or group of variables. It is
possible to hypothesize that divergences are assertions of national in-
terest. In the case of the developing countries, about fourteen of their
members stand to suffer when nodule metals reach world markets.
This is indeed a very small minority of the over 100 member states of
the Group of 77. It seems likely that the majority of developing states
will not benefit from ocean mining unless a compensatory or
regulatory program is introduced, programs which will naturally
restrict revenues. In fact, revenues produced during the formative
years of nodule exploitation may not meet the level demanded for a
compensatory scheme. A large number of developing countries remain-
ed silent when this issue was under discussion at Caracas, indicating to
this writer at least, that there remains considerable skepticism on their
part as a whole concerning the limitation of production. Unless seabed
production develops on a large scale, even to the point of being
detrimental to land-based producers, and unless revenues produced are
unhindered by large scale compensation plans, the future of revenue
outflows to developing countries appears bleak.
The developed countries are similarly divided over the production
control issue. Countries such as Australia and Canada are producers of
metals likely to be recovered from nodules. Nickel, the most sought
after nodule extract, is now produced largely by Canada. For Canada
and Australia, production controls are a must for assuring future
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mineral outlets for their metals. However, the United States and the
USSR are also major mineral producers. Nevertheless, the United
States leads the world in metal consumption and importation. Seabed
nodules could be welcome relief for American industries as an alter-
native source of metals as opposed to present suppliers.
Another group of developed countries, shown in Figures 6 and 7,
are supportive of production controls apparently due to a sympathetic
concern for the developing countries. This relationship was not tested
and is purely conjectural. Another logical reason for the position taken
by these countries involves the Authority itself, that is, restricted pro-
duction means restricted revenues, and without revenues, the Interna-
tional Authority will never be as effective as the developing countries
might desire it to be.
III. CONCLUSIONS
According to Gerhard von Glahn a law-making treaty is:
an instrument through which a substantial number of states declare
their understanding of what a rule of law is, by which new general
rules for the future conduct of the ratifying or adhering states are
laid down, by which some existing customary or conventional rule of
law is abolished or by which some new international agency is
created. 27
If a law-making treaty requires a "substantial" number of adherents in
order to promulgate a rule of international law, then certainly the
identity of the states which establish the law is vitally important to the
effectiveness of the new rule. If we examine each of the three issues
analyzed in this study, we find that a majority of states take an inter-
nationalist position in reference to the alternatives which should be
chosen. For example, on Variable 3, seventy-eight percent of all
debate participants demonstrated a preference for an internationalist
position. Are we at the threshold of a new international legal order?
Our conclusions unfortunately fail to point toward the kind of con-
sensus needed to promulgate a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty.
Briefly, our analysis reveals that:
(1) When Variables 1 and 2 (the "power" variables) were com-
pared, a clear division emerged between developing and developed
2? G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 11 (3d ed. 1976).
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states. This relationship transcended East-West boundaries as ex-
emplified by the Soviet Union's rather Western stand.
(2) Positions on "Competency of the Authority" and "Locus of
Decisional Power" do not relate significantly to positions taken on
"Resource Management". When Variables 1 and 3 were crosstabu-
lated, the coefficient of determination was only .08.
(3) GNP intra-group breakdowns on Variable 3 seemed to be
most pronounced among the developed countries. Figures 4 and 6
show a minority of developed states retaining strong nationalist posi-
tions when production management was considered. While several
developing countries took a middle stand on Variable 3, all but four
developed states assumed a strong internationalist stand on the same
issue.
(4) States classified "low" on per capita GNP as a group ranked
consistently more internationalist than any other group. States
classified as having "high" per capita GNP constituted the only group
ranking as nationalist on all variables.
(5) Iberians- Portugal and Spain-appeared to be the most inter-
nationalist geographical group (on all seabed issues).
(6) The majority of states which were nationalist on Variable 1
were internationalists on Variable 3 (77.8 percent).
(7) On Variables 2 and 3, when data were recorded to include a
"medium" category, the majority of states took a middle or interna-
tionalist position.
The issue we tested which garnered the most consensus, nationalist
or internationalist, was "Resource Management". After completing the
original analysis, a series of crosstabulations were run based on record-
ed GNP groups. This analysis revealed that on Variables 2 and 3 the
majority of all states took "middle" or "internationalist" positions. This
may indicate that Law of the Sea participants are edging toward con-
sensus on these two issues; however, in terms of issue linkage, our
analysis shows the variation of opinion on Variable 2 to be most closely
linked to Variable 1 and not Variable 3. This conclusion leads us to
posit that despite the considerable agreement on "Resource Manage-
ment," the establishment of an Authority rests more crucially on suc-
cessful negotiation of Variables 1 and 2, but at the present, successful
negotiation appears to be impeded by the so-called North-South
cleavage.
Oliver Schroeder has written that the sea law debate is a "political
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problem, not a legal problem." 28 The Third U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea has provided a forum in which highly volatile political
issues can be debated. Unfortunately, U.N. conferences have two ma-
jor drawbacks. First, the developing countries constitute a numerical
majority while the developed countries constitute the minority, and
often it is the approval of the minority which gives impetus to any
decision of the majority. Secondly, political debates in U.N. forums of
recent vintage have tended to evolve into symbolic confrontations, and
when this situation exists, the willingness to consider ocean matters as
a set of technical problems evaporates. 29 The opinions of ocean experts
are apt to be cast aside only to be replaced with a tendency toward
bombastic ideological debate. These tendencies create a rather
pessimistic outlook for an international seabed regime in the near
future.
28 Schroder, The Law and the Sea: An Introductory Comment, 8 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 5, 9 (1976).
29 Freidheim, A Law of the Sea Conference- Who Needs It, in INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF OCEAN SPACE 57-58 (R. Wirsing ed. 1974).
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